Demand-Pull Inflation under Johnson

90문장 100% 인도네시아어 번역 1명 참여 출처 : 칸아카데미

Demand-Pull Inflation under Johnson

Male voice: What I want to do in this video is a little bit of 1960's U.S. economic history and then just see if our Aggregate Demand Aggregate Supply model fits the description of what actually happened.

One could argue you don't need the ADAS model to describe what happened, but we should at least make sure that it does describe what happened.

If we go to 1960, this is the very end of the Eisenhower administration.

Eisenhower was a Republican in office.

The only reason why I give his party affiliation is because if the economy is weak, and in 1960 the economy was weak and one can always debate whether it was due to the government or whether it was due to just the natural fluctuations in the economy, but in general, when the economy is weak, it tends to go against the party that is in power.

In 1960, the Republicans were in power.

There was a recession.

One could argue that was a major reason why the Democratic candidate in the 1960 election was able to win, John F. Kennedy. In 1961, JFK is inaugurated.

He becomes President of the United States.

One of his top goals is to try to turn around this economy.

He does it with what can best be described as Keynesian policies, and we'll talk more about that in future videos.

In fact, I should probably devote many videos to Keynesian policies.

It's the general idea that the government might be able to turn around a recession by sparking demand.

The way that it would spark demand is try to put more money in people's pockets, or even in businesses' pockets.

It would do that through some combination of increased government spending, maybe somehow giving money to the poor, some types of transfer programs, and tax cuts for people and for businesses so that they have more money to spend.

These policies get implemented and over John F. Kennedy's term you do have GDP begins to turn back around, unemployment, I'll just write employment goes up, and inflation stays low.

Inflation is low.

These are all of the things that you want in an economy.

Unfortunately, this is just kind of a sad human event, in 1963, John F. Kennedy, you probably know, is assassinated.

Then his Vice President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, that is LBJ right over there, Lyndon Baines Johnson becomes President.

LBJ becomes President.

A little bit of trivia: He's tied for the tallest President in U.S. history, tied with Abraham Lincoln at 6'4".

He inherits a very, very good economy; almost, one could argue, a perfect economy.

If Keynesian policies were really to be practiced here to their full idea, in theory, once the economy started to get a little bit really overheated and really approaching its potential, in maybe 1964-1965, the government maybe should have started to pull back a little bit on its spending so that the economy doesn't get overheated.

But Lyndon Baines Johnson did not do this.

He kept things going, and in fact he added more fuel to the fire.

One could argue that some of it was driven by geopolitics.

A major factor was right over here, the Vietnam War, which was escalated in a major way under LBJ's administration.

JFK was already dabbling in Vietnam, but it became a really major war for the United States under Lyndon Baines Johnson.

So some combination of Vietnam, and he had a huge number of social programs, increased government spending, to try to ease inequality in the U.S. as well, so social programs.

One could call it guns and butter.

Social programs to try to ease inequality.

The net effect of this is government spending even though the economy was already red hot, it was already at its potential, he wanted to increase government spending even more, so he kind of took it beyond its potential.

He made it overheat a little bit and what happens in 1966 and onwards is that you have inflation starting to grow at a fairly uncomfortable rate.

Inflation starts to grow dramatically.

Just to get a sense of it, when I keep saying that the economy was at its potential and maybe he might have taken a little bit of his pedal off the gas, or his foot off of the pedal, I should say, is as we get into the beginning of his administration, 1964-1965, unemployment is in the 4-5% range.

Inflation is in the 1-2% range.

GDP is growing at a very healthy rate.

Despite that, and maybe he could argue maybe his hand was forced by geopolitical events especially on military funding, the government continues to even spend more money, stimulates things even more because that money goes to soldiers' salaries, it goes to companies that provide, I guess that make napalm or make boats or make whatever else.

All of these government programs inject even more dollars into the economy, and so you ended up with inflation. The economy was already operating at close to capacity and it made it go maybe even beyond its natural capacity.

Let's see whether our ADAS model would make, would allow for this to happen, or would describe this, or would predict this given what was going on.

Let's draw ...

That right over there is my price axis.

This right over here is my real GDP axis.

Let me scroll down a little bit.

This right over here is real GDP.

If we go into the 1964-1965 timeframe, you could say that the U.S. is performing at its potential GDP. When I talk about its potential GDP, I'm saying that on the long run, assuming that people aren't overworked, assuming that factories are getting their proper maintenance,

they're not being run so hard that they start cracking at the seams, this is how much that the U.S. can produce.

If theory, if everyone worked even harder and didn't sleep and were doing things in an unsustainable way, they might even be able to produce more.

One could view this as a theoretical maximum.

When we talk about potential we're not talking about that short term theoretical maximum, we're talking about the maximum GDP that an economy can produce, I guess you could say, in a healthy way, or over the long run, assuming that people aren't overworked and that the factories aren't overworked in some way, shape or form.

This could be our situation maybe in 1964-1965.

Let's draw this right over here is the level of prices.

We just want to see if, in general, we get this type of thing happening from our model.

This is our aggregate supply in the long run.

Our aggregate supply in the short run we know might look something like this.

That's aggregate supply in the short run.

Then from our model we will assume ...

Let me draw that a little bit neater so it intersects a little bit better.

This right over here is aggregate ... let me draw it a little bit better than that with the slope ...

This is our aggregate supply in the short run.

Aggregate supply in the short run.

Let's draw our aggregate demand.

I'll do that in this green color.

Aggregate demand might look something like that.

That is our aggregate demand.

This is 1964-1965. Here we are, the economy's humming along at its potential.

Now more gas is thrown on the flame.

Government accelerates its spending; not just to turn on the economy;

now because of Vietnam and all of these social programs. What's going to happen?

That money's ending up in company and people's pockets, they're going to demand more.

It's going to shift the demand curve to the right.

At any given price, they're going to demand more.

Aggregate demand is going to shift to the right.

Maybe it goes, it shifts to the right, and maybe it goes someplace right over there.

What is the new short term equilibrium?

Aggregate demand is intersecting aggregate supply right over here.

Right over there, and as we see, the equilibrium level of prices on this model now has gone up.

Our productivity, we're now producing above potential.

We're overheating a little bit.

Actually, if you look at the data in 1966-1967, unemployment did become ridiculously low.

It even got in kind of the three point something percent for a little while.

Many people would argue that even now that is an unnaturally low level of unemployment;

that people and factories are really operating at, maybe beyond full capacity, or beyond a sustainable full capacity.

But, we see from this model what you think would happen actually does happen.

Prices would go up.

Right over there.

Then on the long run, you really wouldn't be able to sustain this level of producing above your potential,

and over the long run things would settle back right over here, and all you're left with, really, is the inflation.

번역 0%

Demand-Pull Inflation under Johnson발음듣기

Male voice: What I want to do in this video is a little bit of 1960's U.S. economic history and then just see if our Aggregate Demand Aggregate Supply model fits the description of what actually happened.발음듣기

One could argue you don't need the ADAS model to describe what happened, but we should at least make sure that it does describe what happened.발음듣기

If we go to 1960, this is the very end of the Eisenhower administration.발음듣기

Eisenhower was a Republican in office.발음듣기

The only reason why I give his party affiliation is because if the economy is weak, and in 1960 the economy was weak and one can always debate whether it was due to the government or whether it was due to just the natural fluctuations in the economy, but in general, when the economy is weak, it tends to go against the party that is in power.발음듣기

In 1960, the Republicans were in power.발음듣기

There was a recession.발음듣기

One could argue that was a major reason why the Democratic candidate in the 1960 election was able to win, John F. Kennedy. In 1961, JFK is inaugurated.발음듣기

He becomes President of the United States.발음듣기

One of his top goals is to try to turn around this economy.발음듣기

He does it with what can best be described as Keynesian policies, and we'll talk more about that in future videos.발음듣기

In fact, I should probably devote many videos to Keynesian policies.발음듣기

It's the general idea that the government might be able to turn around a recession by sparking demand.발음듣기

The way that it would spark demand is try to put more money in people's pockets, or even in businesses' pockets.발음듣기

It would do that through some combination of increased government spending, maybe somehow giving money to the poor, some types of transfer programs, and tax cuts for people and for businesses so that they have more money to spend.발음듣기

These policies get implemented and over John F. Kennedy's term you do have GDP begins to turn back around, unemployment, I'll just write employment goes up, and inflation stays low.발음듣기

Inflation is low.발음듣기

These are all of the things that you want in an economy.발음듣기

Unfortunately, this is just kind of a sad human event, in 1963, John F. Kennedy, you probably know, is assassinated.발음듣기

Then his Vice President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, that is LBJ right over there, Lyndon Baines Johnson becomes President.발음듣기

LBJ becomes President.발음듣기

A little bit of trivia: He's tied for the tallest President in U.S. history, tied with Abraham Lincoln at 6'4".발음듣기

He inherits a very, very good economy; almost, one could argue, a perfect economy.발음듣기

If Keynesian policies were really to be practiced here to their full idea, in theory, once the economy started to get a little bit really overheated and really approaching its potential, in maybe 1964-1965, the government maybe should have started to pull back a little bit on its spending so that the economy doesn't get overheated.발음듣기

But Lyndon Baines Johnson did not do this.발음듣기

He kept things going, and in fact he added more fuel to the fire.발음듣기

One could argue that some of it was driven by geopolitics.발음듣기

A major factor was right over here, the Vietnam War, which was escalated in a major way under LBJ's administration.발음듣기

JFK was already dabbling in Vietnam, but it became a really major war for the United States under Lyndon Baines Johnson.발음듣기

So some combination of Vietnam, and he had a huge number of social programs, increased government spending, to try to ease inequality in the U.S. as well, so social programs.발음듣기

One could call it guns and butter.발음듣기

Social programs to try to ease inequality.발음듣기

The net effect of this is government spending even though the economy was already red hot, it was already at its potential, he wanted to increase government spending even more, so he kind of took it beyond its potential.발음듣기

He made it overheat a little bit and what happens in 1966 and onwards is that you have inflation starting to grow at a fairly uncomfortable rate.발음듣기

Inflation starts to grow dramatically.발음듣기

Just to get a sense of it, when I keep saying that the economy was at its potential and maybe he might have taken a little bit of his pedal off the gas, or his foot off of the pedal, I should say, is as we get into the beginning of his administration, 1964-1965, unemployment is in the 4-5% range.발음듣기

Inflation is in the 1-2% range.발음듣기

GDP is growing at a very healthy rate.발음듣기

Despite that, and maybe he could argue maybe his hand was forced by geopolitical events especially on military funding, the government continues to even spend more money, stimulates things even more because that money goes to soldiers' salaries, it goes to companies that provide, I guess that make napalm or make boats or make whatever else.발음듣기

All of these government programs inject even more dollars into the economy, and so you ended up with inflation. The economy was already operating at close to capacity and it made it go maybe even beyond its natural capacity.발음듣기

Let's see whether our ADAS model would make, would allow for this to happen, or would describe this, or would predict this given what was going on.발음듣기

Let's draw ...발음듣기

That right over there is my price axis.발음듣기

This right over here is my real GDP axis.발음듣기

Let me scroll down a little bit.발음듣기

This right over here is real GDP.발음듣기

If we go into the 1964-1965 timeframe, you could say that the U.S. is performing at its potential GDP. When I talk about its potential GDP, I'm saying that on the long run, assuming that people aren't overworked, assuming that factories are getting their proper maintenance,발음듣기

they're not being run so hard that they start cracking at the seams, this is how much that the U.S. can produce.발음듣기

If theory, if everyone worked even harder and didn't sleep and were doing things in an unsustainable way, they might even be able to produce more.발음듣기

One could view this as a theoretical maximum.발음듣기

When we talk about potential we're not talking about that short term theoretical maximum, we're talking about the maximum GDP that an economy can produce, I guess you could say, in a healthy way, or over the long run, assuming that people aren't overworked and that the factories aren't overworked in some way, shape or form.발음듣기

This could be our situation maybe in 1964-1965.발음듣기

Let's draw this right over here is the level of prices.발음듣기

We just want to see if, in general, we get this type of thing happening from our model.발음듣기

This is our aggregate supply in the long run.발음듣기

Our aggregate supply in the short run we know might look something like this.발음듣기

That's aggregate supply in the short run.발음듣기

Then from our model we will assume ...발음듣기

Let me draw that a little bit neater so it intersects a little bit better.발음듣기

This right over here is aggregate ... let me draw it a little bit better than that with the slope ...발음듣기

This is our aggregate supply in the short run.발음듣기

Aggregate supply in the short run.발음듣기

Let's draw our aggregate demand.발음듣기

I'll do that in this green color.발음듣기

Aggregate demand might look something like that.발음듣기

That is our aggregate demand.발음듣기

This is 1964-1965. Here we are, the economy's humming along at its potential.발음듣기

Now more gas is thrown on the flame.발음듣기

Government accelerates its spending; not just to turn on the economy;발음듣기

now because of Vietnam and all of these social programs. What's going to happen?발음듣기

That money's ending up in company and people's pockets, they're going to demand more.발음듣기

It's going to shift the demand curve to the right.발음듣기

At any given price, they're going to demand more.발음듣기

Aggregate demand is going to shift to the right.발음듣기

Maybe it goes, it shifts to the right, and maybe it goes someplace right over there.발음듣기

What is the new short term equilibrium?발음듣기

Aggregate demand is intersecting aggregate supply right over here.발음듣기

Right over there, and as we see, the equilibrium level of prices on this model now has gone up.발음듣기

Our productivity, we're now producing above potential.발음듣기

We're overheating a little bit.발음듣기

Actually, if you look at the data in 1966-1967, unemployment did become ridiculously low.발음듣기

It even got in kind of the three point something percent for a little while.발음듣기

Many people would argue that even now that is an unnaturally low level of unemployment;발음듣기

that people and factories are really operating at, maybe beyond full capacity, or beyond a sustainable full capacity.발음듣기

But, we see from this model what you think would happen actually does happen.발음듣기

Prices would go up.발음듣기

Right over there.발음듣기

Then on the long run, you really wouldn't be able to sustain this level of producing above your potential,발음듣기

and over the long run things would settle back right over here, and all you're left with, really, is the inflation.발음듣기

Top